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1 
A SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT REFORM THAT COULD HAVE 
PUT THE CAP BACK ON MISDEMEANOR SENTENCING FOR 
COLORADO’S NONCITIZENS 
A power struggle between the states and the federal government has 
reached a heightened tension in the past year with the United States even 
filing a lawsuit against the State of California.1 This heightened tension 
has been brought on by the conflict between the current administration’s 
intensified efforts at deporting removable noncitizens and local law en-
forcement agencies that have instituted various policies to limit their 
cooperation with federal immigration enforcement agents, more com-
monly known as “sanctuary cities” or “sanctuary states.”2 The debate 
over the permissibility of these policies has largely focused on the inter-
section between the supremacy of federal immigration law to preempt 
state laws that “create an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress”3 and the federal government’s inability to commandeer state 
officers to carry out federal commands.4 Importantly, the states maintain 
a key power free from potential federal interference, which comes in the 
form of the power to establish state criminal laws and appropriate sen-
tencing outside of the immigration context.5 Federal immigration authori-
ties frequently depend on the elements of these state criminal laws and 
their sentences to determine whether a specific conviction qualifies as a 
deportable offense.6 
Recently, the Colorado legislature debated a small reform that 
sought to utilize this key state power, in order to help Colorado’s author-
ized noncitizens7 avoid removal proceedings and potential deportation 
for certain first-time, low-level criminal convictions.8 That small but 
  
 1. Adam Liptak, Sessions Targets California Immigrants Using a Ruling That Protected 
Them, N.Y. TIMES (March 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/politics/jeff-sessions-
california-lawsuit.html. 
 2. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 3. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 406 (2012) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 67 (1941)). 
 4. Printz v. Unites States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
 5. See Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Ap-
proach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 266–68 
(2012). 
 6. Id. 
 7. For purposes of this brief article, the term “authorized noncitizen” refers to those nonciti-
zens who have obtained a form of authorization to remain in the country from the United States 
government. While the precise consequences of criminal convictions can vary depending on the type 
of authorization, this broad term suffices for the general scope of this article because under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act any noncitizen remains subject to potential deportation. See 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1227(a), 1101(a)(3) (2012). 
 8. Jesse Paul, Effort to Help Immigrants in Colorado Avoid Deportation Gets Some GOP 
Support, but is Set Aside in Legislature for Summer Work, DENV. POST (April 10, 2018), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/04/10/364-days-in-jail-bill-colorado-immigrants/. 
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significant reform came in the form of Senate Bill 18-166 (SB 18-166), 
which reduced the maximum sentence for class 2 misdemeanors, misde-
meanors without a mandated penalty, and municipal violations by one 
day, from one year to 364 days.9 This one day reduction would have 
fixed a minor incongruency between Colorado’s maximum sentencing 
for these categories of low-level offenses and the minimum potential 
sentence required for certain offenses to qualify as removable under fed-
eral immigration law. Unfortunately, SB 18-166 did not survive the de-
bate and the Colorado House of Representatives killed the bill on May 9, 
2018, missing an important opportunity to align Colorado’s criminal 
sentencing with federal immigration law. 
Like Colorado Senator Ray Scott, who voted to strike down a simi-
lar bill last year, some believe that this reform seeks “special treatment” 
for noncitizens.10 This belief, however, is out-of-place. Rather, this bill 
provided more equal treatment under Colorado law to Colorado’s lawful-
ly present noncitizens, a group of people that embodies an integral part 
of Colorado’s communities and economy.11 This reform remains neces-
sary to create more equal treatment for this group because they can un-
fortunately find themselves in county or municipal courts on criminal 
charges for low-level offenses, as with any person in Colorado. Howev-
er, Colorado’s current criminal sentencing system exposes its noncitizens 
to drastically harsh collateral consequences that a citizen does not face 
for the same first-time low-level conviction.  
Under current federal immigration law, even if a Colorado judge 
decides to sentence an authorized noncitizen to a sentence that is much 
less than the one-year maximum for these low-level convictions, “crimes 
involving moral turpitude” with a potential sentence of a year or more 
subjects authorized noncitizens to removal proceedings and potential 
deportation.12 Therefore, in the federal system, regardless of the fact that 
Colorado has generally categorized these offenses as less serious misde-
meanors, these offenses become deportable offenses because their poten-
tial sentence crosses the barrier beyond 364 days into a year.13 In this 
way, the judgment of what the Colorado legislature previously intended 
  
 9. S.B. 18-166, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).  
 10. Change Max Criminal Penalty One Year to 364 Days: Hearing on H.B. 17-1268 Before 
the S. Comm. on State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Colo. 2017). 
 11. See generally NEW AMERICAN ECON., THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEW AMERICANS IN 
COLORADO 2–3, 5–7, 10, 14–15 (2016), http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/nae-co-report.pdf (providing an overview of immigrant contributions to 
Colorado’s economy in 2014, which included approximately $1.0 billion in state and local taxes; 
10% of the overall workforce; employing 83,794 people; 52% of maids and housekeeping cleaners; 
32% of agricultural workers; 26% of construction laborers; and 23% of students earning science, 
technology, engineering, and math PhDs). 
 12. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012), with COLO. REV STAT. § 18-1.3-501(1)(a) 
(2018) (establishing “[t]hree months imprisonment, or two hundred fifty dollars fine, or both” as the 
minimum sentence for a misdemeanor 2). 
 13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
2018] NONCITIZEN MISDEMEANOR REFORM 3 
as the just and proportionate maximum for these low-level offenses be-
comes unintentionally exacerbated into a much more severe sentence by 
an unintentional overlap with the minimum threshold imposed by federal 
immigration law.  
Furthermore, other collateral immigration consequences may still 
stem from these types of convictions that this bill would not have neces-
sarily addressed, including potential bars to citizenship,14 bars to adjust-
ments of status,15 and difficulty with reentering the country from travel-
ing abroad.16 While the precise consequences of this reform are beyond 
the scope of this brief article, the broad benefits of SB 18-166 to Colora-
do’s noncitizens and court dockets should have been sufficient to justify 
passing this reduction of the maximum sentence by one day for these 
first-time, low-level convictions.  
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that any “alien 
who . . . is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed 
within five years or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful per-
manent resident status . . . after the date of admission and is convicted of 
a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is 
deportable.”17 Unfortunately, the INA does not provide a definition of 
what qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. Rather, the determi-
nation has been left up to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and 
the federal courts to craft on a case-by-case basis.18 The BIA has general-
ly defined the term “moral turpitude” as relating to conduct that is “in-
herently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of 
morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.”19 
“To involve moral turpitude, a crime requires two essential elements: 
reprehensible conduct and a culpable mental state.”20 However, the cases 
that have developed out of this process do not provide great clarity as to 
precisely which crimes fall into this category and which do not.21 There-
  
 14. See id. §§ 1427(a)(3), 1101(f) (establishing that good moral character can be a discretion-
ary factor). 
 15. See id. §§ 1229(a)–(c), 1182(a)(2)(A). 
 16. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A). 
 17. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 18. See Lindsay M. Kornegay & Evan Tsen Lee, Why Deporting Immigrants for “Crimes of 
Moral Turpitude” is Now Unconstitutional, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB POL’Y 47, 51 (2017). 
 19. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 833–34 (B.I.A. 2016) (quoting Cisneros-Guerrerro v. 
Holder, 774 F.3d 1056, 1058 (5th Cir. 2014)). 
 20. Id. (citing Nino v. Holder, 690 F.3d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
 21. See Kornegay & Lee, supra note 17, at 60–63 (“Despite the convoluted history and con-
sistent judicial critique of the phrase, a fair number of offenses are always considered to involve 
moral turpitude, with courts generally finding explanation unnecessary. Murder and attempted mur-
der, forcible rape, prostitution and solicitation of prostitution, theft with intent to permanently de-
prive (including petty theft), and possession of child pornography are always CIMT. Failure to 
register as a sex offender is never a CIMT. However, there are many other offenses sometimes 
considered CIMT and other times not. Among the offenses that may or may not be CIMT are man-
slaughter, fraud, sex offenses against children, child abandonment and child abuse, indecent expo-
sure, assault, misprision of felony, false statements, and driving under the influence.”). 
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fore, making generalizations about the definition of what constitutes a 
crime involving moral turpitude is almost futile.22  
Instead of utilizing a broad concrete definition or standard, when 
determining whether a conviction qualifies as one involving moral turpi-
tude, the BIA analyzes the statute defining the crime of conviction to see 
if it fits within the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude 
using the “categorical approach.”23 The BIA’s categorical approach fo-
cuses on the minimum conduct that has a realistic probability of being 
prosecuted under the statute, rather than on the specific facts that led to 
the conviction.24 Alternatively, there are some convictions where the 
statute at issue includes some offenses that involve moral turpitude and 
some that do not.25 In these situations, the BIA applies a “modified cate-
gorical approach,” where the record of conviction may be used to identi-
fy the statutory provision that the respondent was convicted of violat-
ing.26 The Supreme Court has recently clarified that the modified cate-
gorical approach only applies to “statutes having multiple alternative 
elements,” and it does not apply to statutes that “enumerate[] various 
factual means of committing a single element.”27 The Supreme Court 
explained this concept further by using the following hypothetical: 
[S]uppose a statute requires use of a “deadly weapon” as an element 
of a crime and further provides that the use of a “knife, gun, bat, or 
similar weapon” would all qualify. Because that kind of list merely 
specifies diverse means of satisfying a single element of a single 
crime—or otherwise said, spells out various factual ways of commit-
ting some component of the offense—a jury need not find (or a de-
fendant admit) any particular item: A jury could convict even if some 
jurors “conclude[d] that the defendant used a knife” while others 
“conclude[d] he used a gun,” so long as all agreed that the defendant 
used a “deadly weapon.”28  
In the end, this analysis rarely provides a clear answer and still leads 
to a lot of uncertainty on behalf of the noncitizen who has been charged 
with a crime that may qualify as a deportable offense. At base, it hardly 
seems like this lengthy analysis provides much clarity to the amorphous 
definition of “moral turpitude.” Despite the BIA developing a great deal 
of precedent, not much seems to have changed since 1951 when a dis-
senting Justice Jackson said, “[T]he guiding line seems to have no rela-
tion to the result reached. . . . How many aliens have been deported who 
  
 22. Id. 
 23. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 831. 
 24. Id. Some circuits have rejected the realistic probability approach, but the Tenth Circuit, 
which controls over Colorado immigration courts has expressly adopted the realistic possibility 
approach. Rodgriguez-Heredia v. Holder, 639 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 25. Id. at 833. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). 
 28. Id. (citations omitted). 
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would not have been had some other judge heard their cases, and vice 
versa, we may only guess. That is not government by law.”29 
While going through Colorado’s entire misdemeanor code to deter-
mine what exactly qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude is great-
ly beyond the scope of this article, at the very least, these are supposed to 
be the crimes that the United States Congress thinks Colorado finds seri-
ous enough to punish by at least a year or more.30 Nonetheless, Colorado 
currently sends a different message. This message takes away a key as-
pect of the state’s criminal justice system that allows for alternative sen-
tencing and rehabilitation, which Colorado even utilizes for more serious 
offenses.31 As vital members of Colorado’s population, noncitizens 
should also have a chance for rehabilitation that the immigration authori-
ties may not permit through the application of their broad categorical 
approach to crime, which does not consider the underlying facts. In this 
way, Colorado’s legislature missed a great opportunity to make its own 
categorical decision that takes advantage of its sovereign power over 
criminal law and sentencing to pursue more equal treatment for its 
noncitizens. In striking down this small change, Colorado’s noncitizens 
may still be separated from their families and communities without hav-
ing that one extra opportunity to makes amends for their mistake by 
working to improve their own lives and the lives of others. 
Of course, deportation may not always be the result after removal 
proceedings commence against an individual because they may be eligi-
ble for relief from removal.32 Despite this, the person still finds them-
selves facing the lengthy, stressful, and destabilizing wait for their case 
to be processed by the heavily congested immigration courts.33 However, 
even after going through this lengthy process, the likelihood of obtaining 
relief at this level remains rather low, especially without the assistance of 
an attorney. 34 Yet, despite this reality, a noncitizen must either forgo an 
attorney or bear the high costs of representation because noncitizens in 
  
 29. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 239–40 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
 31. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-104 (providing the various alternatives that a 
trial court has to imposing a term of imprisonment). 
 32. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
181, 187–92 (2017) (describing the common narrative of immigration adjudications). 
 33. See generally ANDREW R. ARTHUR, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE MASSIVE 
INCREASE IN THE IMMIGRATION COURT BACKLOG, ITS CAUSES, AND SOLUTIONS 1–2 (2017) (sum-
marizing the findings of a June 1, 2017 Government Accountability Office report on the manage-
ment of the immigration court system by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which found 
that the immigration courts’ median pending time for cases increased from 198 days to 404 days 
from 2006 to 2012), https://cis.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/arthur-court-backlog.pdf. 
 34. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration 
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8, 9, 9 n. 37 (2015) (finding that between 2007 and 2012 “detained 
immigrants with counsel obtained a successful outcome (i.e., case termination or relief) in 21% of 
cases, ten-and-a-half times greater than the 2% for their pro se counterparts” and “never-detained 
immigrants with counsel obtained a successful outcome in 60% of cases, three-and-a-half times 
greater than the 17% for their unrepresented counterparts”). 
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removal proceedings do not have the right to a court-appointed attor-
ney.35 
Beyond the benefits that SB 18-166 provided Colorado’s authorized 
noncitizens, it remains important to show many in the Colorado legisla-
ture that this bill did not create a benefit for either unauthorized nonciti-
zens or noncitizens who pose a danger to those around them. First of all, 
unauthorized noncitizens gained no benefit from this reform. These indi-
viduals are already subject to removal on separate grounds and the com-
mission of any crime, regardless of the sentence, only makes it more 
likely that they will be removed.36 Additionally, SB 18-166 extended to 
those offenses that the Colorado legislature has previously determined to 
be lower-level, either by delegating jurisdiction to municipalities, catego-
rizing them as misdemeanors, or setting the maximum penalty to one 
year. The fact that the current one year maximum may make these of-
fenses deportable reflects an unintentional consequence that sends feder-
al immigration authorities the impression that they are serious crimes in 
Colorado. Reducing the maximum jail sentence by one day still subjects 
a person to a lengthy punishment of up to 364 days in jail, which argua-
bly should not even be the case for these low-level offenses.37 
In the future, even if the legislature sees some of these offenses as 
dangerous, the legislature should not abandon this legislation completely. 
If the legislature truly believes that a crime should be subject to the max-
imum penalty of a year, then it should either except those crimes from 
the general 364-day rule or reclassify them as more serious offenses.  
On the other hand, the Colorado legislature should bear in mind that 
there are additional safeguards in the INA that most likely already ad-
dress these concerns surrounding more serious crimes. Specifically, the 
INA provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is con-
victed of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out 
of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether con-
fined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single 
trial, is deportable.”38 While reducing the maximum sentence by one day 
creates an opportunity for a legal immigrant to make amends, repeat 
convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude subject that person to 
removal proceedings without any regard to the maximum sentence.  
Also, the INA provides completely separate grounds of removabil-
ity free from any minimum sentence requirement, which include con-
  
 35. See id. 
 36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (2012). 
 37. Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. REV. 594, 
608–12 (2016) (citing Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313–15, 1317, 
1319, 1330–32, 1368 (2012) (criticizing the assumption that a misdemeanor conviction–the vast 
majority of criminal matters–actually corresponds with guilt in the criminal justice system due to a 
lack of procedural integrity and race, which the immigration system only exacerbates). 
 38. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
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trolled substance offenses;39 certain firearms offenses;40 offenses involv-
ing domestic violence, stalking, violation of a protection order, and child 
abuse;41 and a broad range of more serious offenses under the “aggravat-
ed felony” category.42 The “aggravated felony” category is the only al-
ternative category that also has a minimal sentence requirement.43 How-
ever, instead of the potential sentence, crimes that fall under the “aggra-
vated felony” category require that the sentence imposed actually be a 
year or more.44 As previously mentioned, if the legislature finds that cer-
tain crimes are more serious, they should account for that or make excep-
tions to the general rule of 364 days in future legislation. Even if the leg-
islature sees this potential maximum sentence as necessary, rehabilitative 
sentencing for these first-time, low-level offenses should still be taken 
into account as judges utilize their discretion in sentencing and are not 
obligated to maximize a sentence for these low-level offenses categori-
cally.  
Aside from the benefits that SB 18-166 provided this integral group 
of people contributing to the improvement of Colorado, it also offered a 
greater clarity for defense attorneys advising their noncitizen clients in 
court, leading to more efficient court dockets and better representation. 
As previously mentioned, what exactly qualifies as a “crime involving 
moral turpitude” remains unclear.45 Due to this lack of clarity, defense 
attorneys who are required to advise their clients of the potential immi-
gration consequences of a conviction must inform their clients that these 
first-time, low-level convictions may qualify as deportable offenses.46 In 
the face of the ominous specter of deportation, many noncitizens will 
simply avoid pleading guilty and proceed to trial in hopes that they can 
avoid subjecting themselves to this overly harsh collateral consequence.47 
SB 18-166 provided needed clarity that would have allowed for defense 
attorneys to avoid presenting this dramatic consequence to their nonciti-
zen clients in these cases, which would have incentivized faster resolu-
tion of cases through plea bargaining.48 In this way, fewer cases would 
proceed to costly trials and the courts would be able to focus on cases 
involving more serious offenses than these first-time, low-level offens-
  
 39. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B). 
 40. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(C). 
 41. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E). 
 42. Id. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 43. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (J), (R), (S). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See supra text accompanying notes 16–28. 
 46. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010) (“When the law is not succinct and 
straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that 
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the 
deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”). 
 47. See CHRIS CREIGHTON, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF, LLS 18-0554, SB 18-166 FISCAL 
NOTE, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., at 1–2 (Colo. 2018). 
 48. See id. 
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es.49 However, it bears noting that these offenses may have other collat-
eral consequences that defense attorneys may still have an obligation to 
advise their clients about.50  
This final point regarding improving court dockets only further 
demonstrates the necessity and common sense of this reform. Even with-
out regard to this, at its base, SB 18-166 should have been adopted to 
make a statement of support for Colorado’s noncitizens and their families 
as people. Instead of subjecting Colorado’s noncitizens to the great un-
certainty that stems from a conviction for one of these offenses that may 
qualify as a deportable offense for them, the Colorado legislature had the 
opportunity to make a moral judgment of its own and convey to the fed-
eral government that these first-time, low-level offenses are not as seri-
ous as the INA misconstrues them to be. While the legislature missed 
this great opportunity, Colorado can still offer its noncitizens a chance to 
make amends and work to keep contributing to the fabric of Colorado’s 
culture, economy, and communities in the future. It simply makes no 
sense to allow for the potential sentence of a crime to lead to the actual 
destruction of families and lives for these first-time, low-level convic-
tions. The current scheme only allows for an unintentional overlap with 
the INA’s minimum sentence to blow the cap off of Colorado’s maxi-
mum sentence for its noncitizens. Certainly, Colorado’s noncitizens de-
serve better protection than that for all that they contribute. The Colorado 
legislature needs to show them that by passing a law like SB 18-166. 
Mark Taylor Feero* 
 
  
 49. See id. Again, the processing of misdemeanor convictions itself may not be the best de-
termination of factual guilt due to a lack of procedural integrity and race, which the immigration 
system only exacerbates. See Cházaro, supra note 35, at 608–12. 
 50. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Criminal Defense After Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 508–14 (2012) (discussing the potential duties of criminal defense attorneys 
to advise their noncitizen clients of potential immigration consequences outside of deportation). 
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